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Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited:
What Kind of Employment Arbitration
System has Developed?
ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN AND KELLY PIKE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In an influential 2001 article, Prof. Samuel Estreicher analogized
employment arbitration to a "Saturn" system of justice, referring to the then
prominent economy car line produced by General Motors.2 He contrasted this
to the inequality in the employment litigation system, where a few who were
successfully able to access it would receive a Cadillac system of justice with
high levels of due process, whereas the larger group of employees who were
unable to obtain access to the courts would be left with a Rickshaw system
providing no effective access to justice for their claims.
Estreicher's argument resonates powerfully because it provides a positive
public policy vision justifying the use of employment arbitration and guiding
its development. It moves beyond the at times formalistic and simplified
assumptions of many of the court decisions that led to the expanded deferral
*Alexander J.S. Colvin is the Martin F. Scheinman Professor of Conflict Resolution
at Cornell University; Kelly Pike completed her Ph.D. at Cornell University and is
currently a Post-Doctoral researcher in Toronto, Canada.
I Access to the data examined in this study was thanks to the assistance of the
American Arbitration Association, which we very gratefully acknowledge. We would
particularly like to express our appreciation to the staff of the AAA's Boston office,
where we conducted our review of the employment arbitration case files, which they had
assembled from across the country. Given the sensitive nature of many of the issues
around employment arbitration, organizations involved in this area have natural concerns
about disclosure of information. There is a tension between the privacy interests in
employment arbitration and the importance of the public policy issues involved. In our
view it is to the AAA's credit that they provided us with access to this data for research
purposes, which we hope will advance public policy and knowledge in this area. Any
findings, conclusions, and errors in this research are, of course, entirely our own
responsibility.
2 Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Pre-
Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 Om1o ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 559, 563-
66 (2001).
3 Id. at 563-64.
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of the courts to arbitration. Rather than simply arguing that interpretation of
the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of arbitration agreements,
Estreicher is arguing that as a matter of public policy we should be
supporting the expansion of mandatory employer promulgated arbitration
procedures because they will enhance the access by employees to justice in
the workplace. If correct, this provides perhaps the strongest rationale for
mandatory arbitration and should lead to both legislative and judicial actions
directed at removing impediments to its adoption.
Estreicher was able to marshal some empirical evidence about
employment arbitration in support of his argument. However, he was writing
at a time when empirical research on employment arbitration was in its
infancy with only a small number of researchers having examined relatively
small samples of arbitration cases.' During the 1990s when this early
research was conducted, relatively fewer employers had yet adopted
mandatory arbitration procedures and few cases had been heard in arbitration
based on these employer promulgated procedures. Indeed, the larger number
of employer arbitration cases during this period were based on individually
negotiated agreements, typically involving higher level employees such as
senior executives who are able to negotiate detailed individual contracts,
often with the assistance of their own legal counsel. Since that time,
4 For example, in the key decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 28 (1991), the majority cited on the key issue of the adequacy of arbitration its
previous reasoning in Mitsubishi Motors that, "So long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the
statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function." Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985). The court provides no
evidence to support this assumption, instead offering it as an assertion that presumes the
conclusion that it is supposed to support. Arbitration can have advantages and
disadvantages as a dispute resolution mechanism. The question for public policy is
whether or not the relevant advantages outweigh the disadvantages of using this
mechanism.
5 See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment
Arbitration: A Look at Actual Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108, 110-12 (1996); Lisa B. Bingham,
Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189-90
(1997); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 29, 30-31 (1998).
6 Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity
Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 405, 408-09 (2007).
7 Lisa B. Bingham, An Overview of Employment Arbitration in the United States:
Law, Public Policy and Data, 23 N. Z. J. INDUS. REL. 5, 9 (1998); Colvin, supra note 6,
at 406-08.
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employer promulgated procedures have spread more widely' and we have
seen larger numbers of cases in arbitration based on these procedures.! As a
result, more recent research has been able to examine larger scale datasets
that focus on employment arbitration cases that are based on employer
promulgated procedures.'o A major source of data driving this new research is
disclosure mandates placed on arbitration service providers under the
California Code of Civil Procedure. However those disclosure requirements
only apply to a limited set of information about each arbitration case,
providing only a partial picture of the current state of employment
arbitration.
In this article, we examine a new, more detailed dataset of employment
arbitration cases administered by the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), which includes information on many important aspects of these cases
that are not included in the California Code of Civil Procedure disclosure
requirements. With the availability of this new data, we are able to revisit
Estreicher's argument and look at the question of whether employment
arbitration has become a new Saturn system of justice providing better access
to employees and to what degree it is different from the Cadillac-Rickshaw
system of justice in employment litigation. We begin by describing our new
data and then turn to examining what it tells us about employment arbitration
as a system ofjustice providing access to employees.
II. THE DATA
In this study, we examine data on all employment arbitration cases that
were administered by the AAA nationally and that terminated in 2008.
Overall there were 449 AAA employment arbitration cases that terminated
that year. Our initial sources of data were AAA files containing information
on the parties; claim and award amounts; key dates for proceedings; and
other important case characteristics. These AAA files are used by the
organization as the basis for its publicly available filings on consumer
8 Alexander J.S. Colvin, Institutional Pressures, Human Resource Strategies, and
the Rise of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 375,
376 (2003); David Lewin, Employee Voice and Mutual Gains, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 60Th
ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ASSOCIATION 61, 61-
62 (2008).
9 Colvin, supra note 6, at 408-09.
10 Colvin, supra note 6, at 407; Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of
Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. of EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
1(2011).
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arbitration cases, which include employment arbitration cases based on
employer promulgated procedures, required under California Civil Code
provisions" regulating arbitration service providers. 2 However, the AAA's
files include additional information that is not required to be included with
the California mandated public filings. In addition, we were able to review in
detail the full case files for 217 of the employment arbitration cases, which
allowed us to investigate a number of aspects of arbitration proceedings not
included in the standard AAA data files. This in-depth case file investigation
also provided an opportunity for checking the reliability of the information in
the AAA data files, and hence, also in the California mandated public
disclosure information provided by the AAA. Our comparison of these data
sources indicates that the AAA's data files and public disclosures are highly
accurate. We identified a few minor corrections in claim and award amounts;
however, the error rates were very low for the relatively large and complex
data sets involved and typical of normal measurement error found in data
sets.
As with any research that focuses on a particular data source, the nature
of the data imposes some limitations that need to be recognized. The AAA is
the largest provider of employment arbitration services, however its practices
and cases may not be representative of other service providers or especially
what is occurring in ad hoc arbitration cases where there is no arbitration
service provider administering the case. Notably, the AAA has written its
employment arbitration rules to comply with the terms of the Due Process
Protocol developed by a number of leading participants in arbitration in the
1990s." For arbitration cases based on employer promulgated procedures, the
AAA policy is that it will not administer cases under procedures that violate
its rules.14 For example, if it decides that the case is based on an employer
11 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2007).
- 12 Colvin, supra note 6, at 407-08; Colvin, supra note 10, at 1.
13 Some other organizations, notably JAMS (Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services, Inc.) in the employment arbitration setting, have also adopted similar due
process protections. Current JAMS policy is that it will not administer any employment
arbitration that does not meet its minimum fairness standards, which parallel the
provisions of the due process protocol, unless the arbitration agreement was individually
negotiated by the employee or negotiated with the advice of counsel. JAMS Policy on
Employment Arbitration Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness, effective Jul. 15,
2009, JAMS, available at www.jamsadr.com/minimum-employment-standards (last
visited May 31, 2013).
14 The AAA's authority to decline cases on this basis is set out in: AAA
Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, effective Nov. 1, 2009
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promulgated procedure, it will only administer the case if the employer pays
the arbitrator's fee, apart from a minimal filing fee." This standard places a
more universal burden on employers than the courts have done, where based
on the Green Tree Financial v. Randolph16 standard the question of whether
or not the employee can be required to pay arbitrator fees is determined on a
case by case basis using the criterion of ability to pay. As a result, we may be
examining a relatively employee-favorable setting for employment
arbitration, particularly in comparison to ad hoc arbitrations where there is no
administering organization.
A. What Types of Claims are Brought in Employment Arbitration?
We begin by examining the type of claims brought in employment
arbitration and the characteristics of the employees who bring them.
1. How Many are Based on Employer Promulgated
Procedures?
Employment arbitration cases can be divided into two categories based
on differences in how the arbitration agreement was formed. Much of the
debates around employment arbitration have focused on what are variously
described as employer promulgated or mandatory arbitration agreements. In
employer promulgated arbitration procedures, the employer adopts
arbitration as a standard policy governing dispute resolution with its
employees. The employees are then presented with the employment
arbitration agreement as a standard form adhesive contract that they must
accept or reject on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The arbitration agreement is a
mandatory term and condition of employment in the sense that if the
prospective employee does not sign it, then the offer of employment will be
rescinded, leading to the moniker of mandatory arbitration. In this respect,
employer promulgated arbitration procedures are similar to many other terms
and conditions of employment that govern most employees, arising from
standard organization-wide employment policies developed by the employer
available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=/IJCM/ADRSTG
_004362&revision=latestreleased (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
15 Jacquelin F. Drucker, The Protocol in Practice: Reflections, Assessments,
Issues for Discussion, and Suggested Actions, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 345, 351
(2007).
16 Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 88-92 (2000).
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that are not subject to individual level variation or modification. Many
employment arbitration cases involve this type of employer promulgated
arbitration procedure" and they have been the focus of much of the debate
over employment arbitration.
However, other employment arbitration cases arise in the context of
individually negotiated agreements. In this setting, the prospective employee
is individually negotiating the terms and conditions of employment and not
simply adhering to standard employment policies of the organizations. The
best known example of this situation is the negotiation of executive level
employment contracts, which include many non-standard features such as
specific termination and severance provisions and individualized
compensation and benefit packages. In the course of individually negotiating
these contracts, some parties enter into arbitration agreements to resolve any
contractual or other disputes that may arise in the course of the relationship.
Beyond the differences in their contractual origins, there are good reasons to
suspect that the characteristics of the employees and the cases they bring
under individually negotiated agreements will differ substantially from their
counterparts under employer promulgated procedures. Individually
negotiated agreements are likely to involve wealthier, more sophisticated
employees who are more likely to be able to retain better legal counsel. The
cases they bring are likely to involve claims based on the individual contracts
they have negotiated, which may provide an easier basis for proving claims
than employment statutes. For this reason, in any empirical analysis of
employment arbitration it is critical to distinguish between cases based on
individually negotiated agreements and those based on employer
promulgated procedures.
In many of the early studies of employment arbitration, most of the cases
included in the datasets involved individually negotiated arbitration
agreements rather than employer promulgated procedures." This may have
17 See, e.g., the procedure at issue in the leading case of Circuit City v. Adams, 532
U.S. 105, 109-10 (2001) was a standard employment arbitration policy that had been
promulgated by the employer throughout the organization on an adhesive basis, without
individual negotiated of its terms with employees. For a more detailed discussion of the
Circuit City arbitration procedure and its promulgation, see Zev Eigen, The Devil in the
Details: The Interrelationship among Citizenship, Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive
Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REv. 381, 401-02 (2008).
18 For example, the early studies of employment arbitration by Bingham (1996,
1997), Maltby (1997), Bingham and Sarraf (2004), and Eisenberg and Hill (2003), all
involve samples that were mostly individually negotiated agreement cases. Eisenberg and
Hill (2003) note this distinction in the types of cases, but only have a relatively small
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contributed to a misleading picture of employment arbitration. Our results
will suggest that arbitration under individually negotiated agreements has
very different characteristics and outcomes than arbitration under employer
promulgated agreements. The dataset of AAA employment arbitration cases
that we analyzed included all individually negotiated and employer
promulgated procedure based cases administered by the AAA in 2008. The
AAA conducts a preliminary review of employment arbitration cases that it
administers before proceeding begin in order to determine which category
they fall into. This classification process conducted by the AAA is
substantively important because the AAA will only administer employer
promulgated procedure cases under its own employment arbitration
procedure rules. These standard AAA rules include a requirement that for
employer promulgated procedure cases the employer pay all arbitrator fees
and administrative costs apart from a small filing fee, whereas the agreement
can determine fee allocation between the parties in individually negotiated
agreement cases. This classification of cases is done based on an internal
review by the AAA of the agreements. In our own review of the materials in
the arbitration case files, we did not find any instances where we would have
made a different classification of the case from that made by the AAA and in
almost all cases the classification process was relatively straightforward.
Overall in our dataset we find that employer promulgated procedure
cases are more common, comprising 325 of the 449 total cases (72.4%),
whereas individual negotiated agreement cases comprise the remaining 124
cases (27.6%). Our dataset includes all cases administered by the American
Arbitration Association in 2008, so this indicates that the largest portion of
employment arbitration by this period involved employer promulgated
procedures. This finding suggests that results from earlier research that
involved samples primarily consisting of individually negotiated agreement
cases should be treated with caution in extrapolating to the more recent
period.
sample of employer promulgated procedure cases, and in their analysis compare litigation
outcomes with those from individually negotiated agreement arbitration cases and not
with the employer promulgated procedure cases. See Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf,
Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and
Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out ofEmployment: Preliminary Evidence that
Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDING OF THE N.Y.U. 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
LABOR 303 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds. 2004); Bingham, supra note 5, at
110-12; Bingham, supra note 5, at 190; Maltby, supra note 5, at 30-31; Theodore
Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An
Empirical Comparison, 58 DIsP. RESOL. J. 44, 44-45 (2004).
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2. How Many Cases Involve Employer Claims?
Another important distinction to make in analyzing arbitration cases is
between cases involving claims by employees and those involving claims by
employers. Although the typical employment case involves an employee
plaintiff making a claim such as being wrongfully terminated or
discriminated against in the workplace, there are also some cases involving
employer claims. Examples of these types of claims include efforts to
recover salary advances paid to employees who quit their employment prior
to the end of the pay period or claims seeking to recover severance payments
where the employee subsequently breaches the terms of the agreement. In
our sample, amongst cases based on employer promulgated procedures, 28 of
325 (8.6%) involved claims by employer plaintiffs. By contrast, amongst
cases based on individually negotiated agreements, 20 of 124 (16.1%)
involve claims by employer plaintiffs. The higher incidence of employer
claims amongst cases based on individually negotiated agreements likely
reflects the more widespread use of salary advances, severance, and other
special payments to higher salary employees. Although they represent only a
small segment of total cases, it is important to account for employer plaintiff
cases since they may have different characteristics from cases brought by
employee plaintiffs. Grouping the two categories of cases together could bias
estimates of case characteristics and outcomes.
3. What Kinds ofEmployees Bring Claims in Employment
Arbitration?
We are able to examine a number of individual characteristics of
employees who bring claims in employment arbitration. Of the employee
plaintiffs in cases based on employer promulgated procedures, we find that
54.8% were men and 31.8% were managers. Amongst these employee
plaintiffs, 83.1% had salaries of under $100,000 per year. These findings
indicate that most plaintiffs in employer promulgated procedure cases are
middle to lower level employees.
By contrast, the characteristics of employee plaintiffs in individually
negotiated agreement cases are very different. Of these employee plaintiffs,
86.4% are male and 65.8% are managers. Amongst these employee plaintiffs,
only 20.9% made less than $100,000 per year, whereas 62.7% made between
$100,000 and $250,000 per year and 16.4% made over $250,000 per year.
This indicates that individually negotiated cases predominantly involved
higher level employees compared to the employees in employer promulgated
procedure cases.
66
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4. What Damages are Claimed in Employment Arbitration?
The median or typical claim brought by employee plaintiffs under
employer promulgated procedures is $167,880. There are some relatively
large claims, with the top 10% of claims being $2,000,000 or greater. There
are relatively few small claims, with the 2 5th percentile of the distribution of
claims falling at $61,984, meaning that three-quarters of the claims are
greater than this amount. This is an important comparison point since some
past research has suggested that damages of at least $60,000 are necessary
for it to be feasible to proceed to litigation with an employment case." Our
results suggest that the claim amounts in arbitration cases based on employer
promulgated procedures are mostly in the range as those that are seen in
litigation.
By comparison, the median or typical claim brought by employee
plaintiffs under individually negotiated agreements is $233,427. There are
also relatively few small claims in this category, with the 2 5th percentile of
the claim distribution falling at $88,204. Interestingly, although the size of
claims brought under individually negotiated agreements is higher, the
median claim is only 39% larger than that for employer promulgated
procedure claims. This may indicate that despite the generally higher salaries
of employees covered by individually negotiated agreements, in either
instance it requires a reasonably large potential claim for it to be feasible to
bring a claim in arbitration.
5. How Many Cases Involve Statutory Claims?
The leading cases and much of the debate around mandatory employer
promulgated procedures in employment arbitration has focused on cases
involving statutory claims.2 Major employment statutes such as Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act embody important public policies, leading to concerns
about the resolution of these statutory rights in the private forum of
employment arbitration. Some researchers have suggested that in practice
this concern is overblown because cases brought in employment arbitration
might not involve many statutory issues.2 The problem with this argument is
19 William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims ofEmployment Discrimination, 50 DisP.
RESOL. J. 40, 44 (1995).
20 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Circuit City v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
21 Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 18, at 44-45.
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that it was based on samples that included mostly cases based on individually
negotiated agreements, rather than the cases based on employer promulgated
procedures that have been at the center of debates around employment
arbitration. By contrast, in our sample, as noted earlier, most of the cases
were based on employer promulgated procedures. We had access to the
complete case files for 217 of the employment arbitration cases, which
allowed us to determine the nature of the claims being brought in them. We
found that 79 out of 146 cases (54.1%) brought by employees under
employer promulgated procedures involved statutory claims. By contrast
only 5 out of 44 cases (11.4%) brought by employees based on individual
negotiated agreements involved statutory claims. These results indicate that
for the type of employer promulgated procedure case that has been the
central focus of public policy debates about employment arbitration,
statutory claims are frequent and constitute a majority of all cases brought.
6. How Many Cases Involve Ongoing Employment, i.e. Not Post
Termination Disputes?
Very few cases involve ongoing employment relationships as opposed to
disputes that arise following termination of the employment relationship. In
only 10 out of 195 cases (5.1%) brought by employees where we could
identify the employment status of the plaintiff was there a non-termination
situation. If anything this may be an upper estimate of the likelihood of
arbitration being used in the context of ongoing employment since we do not
know whether the employee continued in employment after the closing of the
case. Employment arbitration cases mostly involve employees who have
been fired or quit and arbitration does not appear primarily to be a
mechanism for resolving conflict in existing employment relationships.
B. What Type ofRepresentation do Parties Have in Employment
Arbitration?
Representation of parties, particularly of employees, is an important but
understudied phenomenon in employment arbitration. The ability to obtain
effective attorney representation can be a key factor in the ability to proceed
with a claim. The difficulty for employees to obtain effective attorney
representation has been one of the criticisms leveled at the employment
litigation system. Given that most lower to middle income employees will be
unable to afford to pay typical hourly attorney fees, they are left reliant on
the system of contingency fee arrangements, where the plaintiff attorney
68
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himself or herself provides the primary financing for the case and takes the
financial risk of success or failure. The plaintiff attorney financed nature of
this system creates a bias towards only taking cases with a relatively high
prospect of success and large provable damages. This barrier to
representation is at the heart of Estreicher's critique of the Rickshaw-
Cadillac system of justice in litigation. If employment arbitration is to serve
as a more accessible Saturn system of justice, then we should expect to see
employees being more able to obtain representation and/or able to proceed
more effectively without attorney representation than is the case in litigation.
We begin by examining the patterns of representation in employment
arbitration cases and then later turn to the effects of representation.
1. How Many Employees are Self-Represented?
Self-representation is an important phenomenon to consider in evaluating
whether employment arbitration in practice provides a more accessible
dispute resolution system than litigation. In employment litigation, just under
a quarter of employee plaintiffs are self-represented.22 By comparison, in our
sample in 102 out of 325 (31.4%) cases based on employer promulgated
procedures the employee was self-represented with no attorney. This
suggests a slightly higher self-representation rate than in litigation, though
not a large difference. A large majority of employee plaintiffs in both forums
are represented by attorneys. In this area we see a very different pattern for
cases based on individually negotiated agreements, where only 10 out of 124
(8.1%) cases involve self-represented employees. This greater likelihood of
attorney representation likely reflects the higher salaries and professional or
managerial background of employees involved in individually negotiated
agreement cases.
22 Nielsen, Nelson, and Lancaster find in a study of employment discrimination
cases filed in federal district courts that 14.8% of plaintiffs were pro se throughout
litigation and a further 7.7% initially filed pro se but subsequently obtained
representation at some point during the proceedings, making a total of 22.5% of cases
that were initially filed by pro se plaintiffs. Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, &
Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment
Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 175, 200 (2010).
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2. Who Represents Employees and Employers in Employment
Arbitration?
Amongst employees who do have representation in employment
arbitration, what can we say about the attorneys who are providing this
representation? How are they similar or different to the attorneys
representing employers in these cases? One aspect to consider is whether the
attorney specializes in the employment law area. To the degree that the
attorney specializes in employment law cases we might expect greater
knowledge and expertise in this area. This could be a particular advantage in
employment arbitration cases because it could result in greater familiarity
with potential arbitrators, producing an advantage in the arbitrator selection
process. We examined this issue initially by looking at whether or not the
attorneys included employment law amongst their practice areas in the
Martindale-Hubbell listings of attorneys. Almost all the attorneys in our
database were included in the Martindale-Hubbell listings and most of them
listed their practice areas. For those that did not list practice areas or were not
in the directory, we searched other online listings of attorney and/or
consulted their individual websites.
Amongst attorneys representing employees in cases under employer
promulgated procedures, 56.7% included employment law in their primary
practice areas. By contrast amongst attorneys representing employers in the
same cases, 76.6% included employment law in their primary practice areas.
To provide another measure of specialization relative to employment
arbitration in particular, we examined the number of cases in our database
that the same firm handled. We focused on law firm rather than individual
attorney here to look at the degree to which firms provide expertise to
parties. In cases based on employer promulgated procedures, most often the
law firm representing the employee only appeared once in our database, with
only 10.7% of cases involving an employee side law firm that appeared in
two or more cases. By contrast, in over half of these same cases, 54.6% of
the time, the employer was represented by a law firm that handled more than
one case in our dataset. What these statistics indicate is that in employment
arbitration under employer promulgated procedures, employers are much
more likely to be represented by attorneys that specialize in employment law
and by law firms that handle employment arbitration cases frequently.
Some similar patterns are found in cases based on individually negotiated
agreements, though the differences between employee and employer
representation are smaller. In cases based on individually negotiated
agreements, 46.7% of the time the employee was represented by an attorney
specializing in employment law, whereas 60.8% of the time the employer
70
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was represented by an employment law specialist. Only 6.7% of the time in
the individually negotiated agreement cases was the employee represented by
a law firm appearing more than once in our database, whereas in those same
cases 19.3% of the time the employer was represented by a firm appearing
more than once in our database.
C. How Does the Process ofEmployment Arbitration Work?
1. How Many Cases Settle?
Our detailed analysis focuses on the files of cases that were resolved
through an award, i.e. a final decision by an arbitrator. However we are able
to examine patterns of type of disposition using a broader dataset of all
employment and consumer cases administered by the AAA. This dataset is
provided to the public by the AAA under California Code provisions
regulating arbitration service providers. It only contains cases brought under
employer promulgated procedures, not those based on individually
negotiated agreements, however it does provide a comprehensive set of all
the AAA's promulgated cases. Using this dataset, we calculate that of the
employment arbitration cases resolved in 2008, 26.9% were disposed of by
an award by an arbitrator. Of the remainder, 13.3% were withdrawn by the
plaintiff and 59.5%, were settled. This settlement rate is similar to the 58%
settlement rate in federal court employment discrimination litigation reported
by Nielsen, Nelson, and Lancaster 3, indicating that in arbitration as in
litigation, the predominant mode of resolution is settlement.
As with litigation settlements, the vast majority of arbitration settlements
are confidential and so we do not know their content. We would certainly
expect that in both forums the settlements would be influenced by the likely
outcomes of a hearing in litigation or arbitration, respectively. However we
do not have evidence on the nature of the cases that are settling and what
type of selection effects this may exert on the sample of cases that do
proceed to a hearing. It may be that defendants are willing to settle relatively
strong cases before a hearing on favorable terms to the plaintiffs, so that only
the less meritorious cases proceed to a hearing. Or alternatively it could be
that plaintiffs are unwilling to proceed with weaker cases to a hearing and
instead are willing to accept any small amount as a settlement, leaving only
the relatively stronger cases to go to a hearing.
23 Id. at 187.
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2. How Frequent are Summary Judgment Motions in Employment
Arbitration?
One procedural step that is likely to influence the selection process of
which cases ultimately go to a hearing is summary judgment. Summary
judgment motions are widely used in litigation, with defendant employers
frequently obtaining dismissals of employment lawsuits.24 Although this
filtering of unmeritorious cases will certainly result in a stronger pool of
cases proceeding towards trial, there may also be an offsetting effect on
settlement behavior. If the employer brings a summary judgment motion that
is denied, this may provide information signaling to the defendant that the
plaintiff has a relatively stronger case and increase the incentive to offer a
larger settlement that is more likely to be accepted. Thus we would expect
settlements between the summary judgment motion and trial stages in
litigation to filter out more of the relatively strong cases, which would then
not proceed to a hearing.
By contrast, arbitrators traditionally disfavored summary judgment
motions. The idea was that arbitration is a process that provides a hearing on
the merits of the case without complex procedures or legal formalities.
Indeed the absence of motion practice with its potential advantages to
employers is one of the strong arguments in favor of employment arbitration
being an employee-favorable "Saturn" system of dispute resolution in
Estreicher's terms.25 However in recent years there have been anecdotal
suggestions that motion practice and summary judgments have increased in
frequency in employment arbitration as the procedure has become dominated
by attorneys accustomed to litigation practice.
We were able to examine this issue in our study by examining the
number of employment arbitration cases in which defendants filed summary
judgment motions with the arbitrator and the numbers that were granted. We
were able to do this for the 217 employment arbitration cases for which we
were able to review the full case file, including all motions filed. Overall, we
found that motions for summary judgment were made in 52 of 217 cases or
23.9% of the time. Of these motions, 25 were granted in full and 12 in part,
indicating some degree of success in 37 cases or 17.1% of the time. Amongst
different types of cases, we found the highest incidence in cases brought by
employees under employer promulgated procedures, where there were 43
24 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 432-36 (2004).
25 Estreicher, supra note 2, at 563.
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motions for summary judgment out of 149 cases or 28.9% of the time. These
motions were fully granted in 21 cases and partially granted in 12 cases, for a
total of 33 cases or 22.1% in which there was some degree of success with a
summary judgment motion. Although still occurring in a minority of all
cases, these results indicate that summary judgment has become a significant
element in employment arbitration and that in a number of cases it results in
the plaintiff not being able to obtain a hearing on the merits.
3. How Long do Cases Take to be Resolved?
One of the key advantages of arbitration in the area of accessibility is
that cases take less time to proceed to a hearing than do cases in litigation. In
employment litigation, it is typical for cases to take around two years on
average to reach trial, whereas in employment arbitration, time to hearing is
more typically around one year.26 The time to hearing in our sample is
consistent with these findings. Amongst employment arbitration cases in
2008 based on employer promulgated procedures, we found a mean time
from initial filing to resolution following a hearing of 366.9 days, almost
exactly a year. Amongst cases that settled in this group, we found a mean
time from filing to settlement of 278.9 days.
4. How Many Hearing Days do Cases Involve?
Another aspect of the argument in favor of employment arbitration
accessibility is that the process of resolution tends to be simpler. One
indicator of this is the amount of time it takes to conduct a hearing. The
median or typical case in our sample had two days of hearings and one
preliminary organizational conference call. Some cases did involve more
extensive proceedings. The upper tenth percentile of cases in terms of
hearing length involved 5 or more days of hearing and 2 or more preliminary
conference calls. This pushes the mean or average number of hearing days
per case up to 2.3 and the average number of preliminary conference calls to
1.5. Interestingly, these statistics do not vary significantly between employer
promulgated procedure and individually negotiated agreement cases,
indicating similar levels of procedural complexity for these two categories.
Overall employment arbitration appears to involve some degree of
procedural complexity, though less than we would expect in typical court
proceedings.
26 Colvin, supra note 10, at 8.
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5. How Much are Arbitrator Fees?
We find that the median or typical arbitrator fee in a case is $9,450,
whereas the mean or average arbitrator fee is $15,097, indicating a right
skewed distribution with a few relatively large fee amounts. Arbitrator fees
in cases involving employer promulgated procedures are somewhat lower,
with a median fee amount of $8,890 and a mean fee amount of $12,264. By
contrast, for cases involving individually negotiated agreements, the median
fee amount is $13,142 and the mean fee amount is $22,521. Given that the
numbers of preliminary conference calls and numbers of hearing days are
very similar across the two categories of cases, this suggests that arbitrators
in cases involving individually negotiated agreements are charging
substantially higher daily and hourly fee rates than those in cases involving
employer promulgated procedures. This could be an advantage for employer
promulgated procedures in indicating a lower cost procedure, but also may
indicate a disadvantage if the higher fee rates in the individually negotiated
agreement cases reflect arbitrators with greater experience or expertise. In
any event, this will likely have little impact on accessibility from the
employee perspective in that we find in the employer promulgated
procedures cases we examined that the employer paid all arbitrator fees in
accordance with the AAA's policy requiring this in the cases they administer.
The greater impact of arbitrator fee amounts may be on whether it affects the
employer decision whether or not to promulgate a mandatory arbitration
procedure in the first place.
D. What are the Outcomes ofEmployment Arbitration?
1. What is the employee win rate?
Employee win rates in employment arbitration vary substantially
depending on the type of case and whether the employee or the employer is
the plaintiff. In the cases based on employer promulgated procedures where
the employee is the plaintiff, employees won 24.7% of the time. This is using
a broad definition of an employee win where there was any finding of
liability, even if the amount of damages awarded was relatively small
compared to the amount claimed. By contrast, in individually negotiated
agreement cases where the employer is the plaintiff, the employee won
64.6% of the time. This may reflect both the greater sophistication and better
counsel available to the generally higher income group of plaintiffs in these
cases. It also may be a product of more of these cases being based on
contractual claims that are easier to establish than the statutory
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discrimination claims more common in the employer promulgated procedure
cases. Meanwhile, in cases where the plaintiff is the employer, there is a
relatively high success rate for these employer plaintiffs under either
employer promulgated procedures, 57.1%, or individually negotiated
agreements, 66.7%.
2. What Damage Amounts are Awarded in Employment
Arbitration?
Damages exhibit a similar pattern of varying with the type of case and
who is the plaintiff. There are a number of different statistical measures of
damage amounts that we can look at to give a fuller picture of the outcomes
of employment arbitration. Focusing initially on the category of cases
brought by employee plaintiffs under employer promulgated procedures, we
find that amongst the 91 cases where the employee won the case, the median
or typical damage award was $39,609. The median claim in these cases was
$100,000, indicating that successful employees typically received around 40
cents on each dollar sought. The mean or average damage award received by
successful plaintiff employees was $81,835, with this larger average
reflecting a right skewed distribution with a few relatively large awards
amongst a greater number of more moderate award amounts. These statistics
give us a picture of the outcomes in cases that employees won. However, it is
also useful to consider the overall nature of outcomes including the cases that
employees lost as well as those the employee won.27 From an economic
perspective, this is the expected outcome across all cases, including both the
probability of success and the amount won if successful. From a legal system
perspective, this is also an important measure because it indicates the average
likely outcome for a plaintiff or plaintiff attorney initiating a case.
Particularly for an attorney who is representing employees in a number of
different cases on a contingency fee basis, it is an important measure because
it indicates the average expected outcome for that whole portfolio of cases.
We find that the mean or average damages amongst the 291 cases brought by
employee plaintiffs under employer promulgated procedures was $19,967.
The patterns of outcomes look very different when we compare different
types of cases and categories of plaintiffs. In cases brought by employee
27 Colvin, supra note 10, at 20.
28 For this category of cases, including employee losses as well as wins, the median
is not a particularly informative statistic, being $0 because most employees lost their
cases.
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plaintiffs under individually negotiated agreements, the median damage
award in the 64 cases won by employees was $75,000 and the average
damages were $220,736. Amongst all 99 cases in this category, including
employee losses, the average damages were $142,465. As expected,
employee plaintiffs recover much more in cases under individually
negotiated agreements than under employer promulgated procedures. This
reflects larger amounts claimed in the individually negotiated agreement
cases with the median damage claim of a successful plaintiff having been
$207,000, so that the typical award of $75,000 represents about 36 cents per
dollar claimed, close to the rate for plaintiffs under employer promulgated
procedures. The more noteworthy difference is that the greater chance of
success for employee plaintiffs under individually negotiated agreements,
combined with the larger amounts being claimed and awarded, means that
the overall expected outcome across all cases is $142,465. This is 7.1 times
as large as the equivalent expected outcome of $19,967 in the employer
promulgated procedure cases. This means that from the perspective of a
plaintiff attorney considering which cases to take in employment arbitration,
there is a strong and clear economic incentive to take cases based on
individually negotiated agreements rather than those based on employer
promulgated procedures.
Damage amounts in cases involving employer plaintiffs are generally
smaller, likely reflecting the different nature of claims in these cases, which
are often efforts to recover overpayments or pre-payments of compensation
to employees.29 For employer promulgated procedure cases with employer
plaintiffs, the median or typical damage award to a successful plaintiff was
$10,000 and the mean award was $39,002. For individually negotiated
agreement cases with employer plaintiffs, the median award to a successful
plaintiff was $36,014 and the mean award was $152,947.
3. How Common are Punitive Damages?
Punitive damages are a relatively uncommon but important remedy in
that they serve to deter egregious behavior by imposing greater sanctions
beyond normal compensatory awards. In the employment law area, a key
feature of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was that it amended Title VII to
permit jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages, albeit with caps
depending on the size of the employer, whereas these had previously not
been permitted in employment discrimination claims under the Federal Civil
76
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Rights Act.0 Punitive damage awards in jury trials are often seen as an
expression of the jury's embodiment of popular outrage at especially
reprehensible conduct by defendants. By contrast, arbitrators are professional
neutrals and may be less likely to be swayed by the same popular concerns of
juries. For critics of litigation, this might be seen as an advantage of
arbitration, but if punitive damage awards are considered an important
element of how the litigation system polices and deters conduct that goes
against public policy then failures to award punitive damages in arbitration
could be of significant concern.
In our dataset we were able to examine the written awards in the 217
cases where we reviewed the full case files and determine whether the
damage awards included a punitive damage component. Of these cases, 80
resulted in plaintiff wins with some amount of damages awarded. Amongst
this group, there was a punitive damage award in three cases, two in cases
based on employer promulgated procedures and one based on an individually
negotiated agreement. What is perhaps more surprising is that all three of
these cases were ones in which the plaintiff was an employer. There were no
cases in our sample where punitive damages were awarded to an employee
plaintiff. We should recognize that given that punitive damages are not
awarded in the typical case, even in litigation, and our sample for this aspect
was not overly large, we may have just happened to draw a set of cases that
did not present appropriate circumstances for punitive damage awards.
However, if we look more broadly at the field of employment law, where a
key public policy purpose is to counteract the danger of abuses by employers
due to their generally greater bargaining power compared to most individual
employees in a free labor market, it is highly disturbing that employment
arbitrators should be viewing employee defendants and not employers as the
appropriate parties against which to award punitive damages. This is an issue
that clearly deserves further examination.
4. How Common are Attorney Fee Awards and How Large are
They?
Another important category of damages in employment law cases are
attorney fee awards. This is particularly important as an incentive for
plaintiff attorneys to take on cases representing employees who often lack the
financial resources to retain counsel out of their personal funds. The prospect
of recovering attorney fees provides an incentive for lawyers to take on cases
30 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 24, at 433.
77
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
where the provable damages may be relatively modest in nature, such as the
lost wages of a lower paid employee. Attorney fees are recoverable under the
key employment statutes, notably in Title VII employment discrimination
cases. In the 217 cases where we were able to review the full arbitration case
file and written award, we were able to identify when attorney fees had been
included as part of the award. We found that in cases based on employer
promulgated procedures with employee plaintiffs, attorney fees were
awarded in 17 of the 71 cases (24%) in which there was an award of
damages. The median or typical attorney fee award was $51,710 and the
mean attorney fee award was $76,467. In cases based on individually
negotiated agreements with employee plaintiffs, attorney fees were awarded
in 13 of 64 cases (20%) in which there was an award of damages. The
median attorney fee award was $48,206 and the mean attorney fee award was
$43,618. These figures indicate that while attorney fees are only awarded in a
minority of cases in employment arbitration, they can be substantial, which
may provide some incentive for plaintiff attorneys to take on these cases.
5. What Factors Predict Win Rates and Damage Awards?
We have seen that win rates and damage awards vary substantially,
depending on whether the case is brought by an employee or an employer
plaintiff and whether it is based on an employer promulgated procedure or an
individually negotiated agreement. What other factors influence outcomes in
employment arbitration? The strongest predictor of outcomes in the data we
examined was whether the employee was self-represented or had
representation by an attorney. Looking just at cases with employee plaintiffs
under employer promulgated procedures, we find that self-represented
employees won 17% of cases they brought, whereas employees represented
by attorneys won 27.9% of cases they brought. In cases that these plaintiff
employees won, self-represented employees were awarded an average of
$11,071 in damages, whereas employees represented by attorneys won an
average of $99,217. Taking into account the chance of winning and the likely
damages awarded, the overall mean outcome across all cases, including
losses, was $27,722 for employees represented by attorneys, but only $1,781
for self-represented employees. These outcomes are strikingly more meager
for self-represented employees.
There is also a difference in outcomes depending on whether the case
involved claims of discrimination, the key category of statutory claims that
has been at the center of much of the debate over employment arbitration.
We find that in cases brought by employee plaintiffs under employer
promulgated procedures, employees won only 17.6% of cases involving
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claims of discrimination compared to 29.0% of cases involving other types of
claims. Where successful in these cases, however, employees who won an
award received an average of $116,191 in cases involving discrimination
claims, but only an average of $63,940 in cases involving other types of
claims. Discrimination claims appear harder to prove, but result in larger
damage awards where successful.
One other factor that appears to predict outcomes is where the cases
occurred. We examined the state in which the case was filed and heard. Our
particular interest was whether there was an effect for California cases, since
that state is often described as being particularly employee friendly and as
having an especially strong plaintiffs bar. We find that in cases with
employee plaintiffs under employer promulgated procedures, employees won
35.1% of cases in California compared to 23.1% of cases in other states.
Similarly, in cases that employees did win, the average damage award in
California was $131,025 compared to $70,811 in other states. The resulting
overall outcome, including both cases won and lost for employees, is a mean
of $46,035 in California compared to $16,169 in other states. The anecdotal
impressions of a significant California effect are supported by our data.
1II. DISCUSSION
Estreicher's Saturn analogy suggests that employer promulgated
arbitration procedures could provide a simple, but fair and accessible system
for employees to resolve disputes, in contrast to the overly complex and
inaccessible system of employment litigation. What do our results indicate
about the degree to which this type of dispute resolution has come into
existence with employer promulgated arbitration?
Some aspects of the current employment arbitration system do accord
with Estreicher's vision. The time it takes to get a hearing, while arguably
still too long at around a year, is shorter than typical in the litigation system.
The employees bringing claims under employer promulgated procedures are
mostly of lower to middle income levels, earning less than $100,000 a year.
Employees do win some cases, just under a quarter of all hearings, and
recover some substantial damages, albeit the employee win rates and damage
amounts are lower than those found in litigation cases that manage to get to
the trial stage. Under the AAA's rules, employers are paying the arbitration
fees, which at almost $10,000 per case could otherwise be a substantial
barrier to access.
In other respects, however, the picture is less encouraging for
Estreicher's vision of a simple, effective, and accessible system. The typical
case in employer promulgated arbitration is a statutory claim based case with
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a fairly substantial damage claim of well over $100,000, which is the type of
case we also typically see in litigation. There are relatively few of the smaller
claims that are often seen as excluded from accessibility in the litigation
system. Although a third of employees are going to arbitration pro se, not
much higher than the one-quarter pro se rate seen in employment litigation,
the majority of two-thirds of employees are proceeding in employment
arbitration with representation from attorneys. Furthermore, the self-
represented employees have lower success rates and receive much smaller
damages. What we are seeing is in some ways a replication of the structure of
the litigation system, where employees mostly need attorney representation
to successfully proceed with claims.
It is also striking the degree to which some of the structural features of
the litigation system for how cases proceed are replicated in arbitration.
Settlement is the predominant mechanism for resolving cases in litigation,
with a smaller number of cases being resolved on preliminary motions and
relatively few proceeding to a hearing." Settlement is similarly the resolution
mechanism for most cases in arbitration.32 The perennial problem of how to
compare litigation and arbitration outcomes, given that different types of
cases may proceed to a hearing, is exacerbated because most cases in both
systems are resolved through private settlements where we have limited
information on the outcomes. It may be that only the stronger cases in
litigation end up going to trial, but it could also be that settlement exerts a
similar filtering effect on the cases that proceed to a hearing in arbitration.
One important structural difference that is often pointed to in litigation is the
availability of summary judgment motions, which result in many cases being
dismissed before trial, often to the defendant employer's advantage."
Traditionally, summary judgment motions were seen as incompatible with
31 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 24, at 440; Nielsen, Nelson & Lancaster, supra
note 22, at 184-88.
32 Nielsen, Nelson & Lancaster, supra note 22, at 184, find in their study of federal
court litigation that 50% of cases are resolved in the early stages of proceedings and a
further 8% following summary judgment motions, for a total of 58% of cases resolved
through settlement. Similarly, Colvin, supra note 9, at 16, finds in a sample of 3940
employment arbitration cases that 59% were resolved through settlement. In that latter
study there was a difference based on representational status, with a 64.8% settlement
rate amongst the 75.1% of cases where the employee was represented by an attorney and
a 41.8% settlement rate amongst the 24.9% of cases where the employee was self-
represented, which combine to yield the overall settlement rate amongst all employment
arbitration cases of 59%.
33 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 24, at 433-35.
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the arbitral forum, where the opportunity to obtain a hearing on the merits of
the case was seen as an important strength of the process. However, we find
that summary judgment motions have become a feature of the employment
arbitration process as well, with such motions being brought in a quarter of
the cases we examined and most of these motions being successful. It
appears that the idea of employment arbitration ensuring a claimant a hearing
on the merits of the case is eroding.
A key aspect of accessibility is whether the costs of proceeding with a
case through the system are low enough to be justifiable given the likely
outcomes of the case. The criticism of litigation as a Cadillac system is
grounded in the idea that this will only be true in the court system for a
strong case with a relatively large damage claim. What do our results tell us
about this calculation for employment arbitration under employer
promulgated procedures? The key economic outcome statistic is the average
award across all cases, including employee losses, so as to include both the
chance of winning and the likely damages that will be awarded if successful.
For employee plaintiffs bringing cases under employer promulgated
procedures, this amount is just under $20,000. How does this compare to the
cost of bringing a case? Although we do not have direct evidence on this, our
results provide some suggestive parameters to work with. The average
arbitrator fee in employer promulgated cases is just over $12,000. It seems
reasonable to assume that an attorney would spend at least as much time
working on a case as the arbitrator and likely significantly more given the
need to engage in preparation and also to conduct pre-hearing discovery. As
a result, this can be viewed as a lower bound estimate on the attorney costs
for a plaintiff bringing a case. Another suggestive parameter is the size of
attorney fees awarded in cases where such fee requests are granted. We find
that the typical attorney fee award in employer promulgated procedure cases
is a little over $50,000. Now it is possible that cases in which attorney fees
are awarded tend to be ones involving greater complexity and where the
burden of such costs on plaintiff employees is higher than usual. For sake of
illustration, let us suppose that average attorney fees for employee fees
across all cases are only half this amount, or $25,000. This would also be
plausible relative to the size of arbitrator fees charged in cases. However it is
also higher, by $5,000, than what we find to be the mean damages outcome
across all cases (about $20,000 as noted above). Put alternatively, in most
cases the cost of obtaining representation to proceed with a case in
employment arbitration under employer promulgated procedures will
outweigh the potential damages that can be expected to be recovered in these
cases. Most often, bringing cases in employment arbitration will not be
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economically viable and the system will not be readily accessible to
employees.
Now this does not mean that there are no economically viable cases in
employment arbitration, and indeed our sample consists of cases that
employees chose to proceed with and that employee side plaintiff attorneys
chose to represent. Where the attorney identifies the case as involving a
relatively strong likelihood of liability and relatively large provable damages
then it may make sense to proceed with the case. We do find that most claims
are relatively large, over $100,000, supporting this inference. The possibility
of attorney fee awards, which are awarded in a quarter of cases, provides a
mechanism for some attorneys to get paid; albeit, given that three-quarters of
the cases did not produce such an award, its impact on accessibility is
somewhat limited. Furthermore, the one-third of employees who proceed pro
se are at least getting a hearing and a small chance of winning some
moderate amount of damages with relatively little direct costs in the absence
of attorney fees or having to contribute to arbitrator fees. Overall, however,
our results indicate that attorney representation is the typical scenario for
bringing cases in employment arbitration and that the economic calculus will
make it difficult for plaintiff attorneys to accept cases unless they offer
relatively high damages and strong prospects of winning.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, the system of employment arbitration under employer
promulgated procedures appears to us to be strikingly similar to the litigation
system in providing relatively little accessibility to employees who do not
have strong cases and large provable damages. One concerning aspect of our
findings is that we examined all cases for the year 2008 based on employer
promulgated procedure administered by the AAA, which is the country's
largest provider of employment arbitration services. Yet the whole
population of employer promulgated procedure based cases resolved through
hearings for the entire year was only 325 cases. Including settlements and
cases withdrawn before a hearing, there were still only 946 arbitration cases
disposed of that year. This relatively small number of cases is despite
employer promulgated procedures now likely covering at least a quarter of
nonunion employees in the United States: around 30 million employees. If
34 Colvin, supra note 5, at 410; David Lewin, Employee Voice and Mutual Gains,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 60T ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS ASSOCIATION 61, 63 (2008).
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even a third of these procedures use the AAA as the arbitration service
provider, we would expect 10 million covered employees." This would mean
that there is only 1 case per 10,000 employees a year, a remarkably low rate.
Where are the missing cases? Our overall conclusion based on our
examination of the operation of the system is that they are not being brought
because employment arbitration is not providing an accessible, economically
viable forum for bringing most employment claims. Instead of a new Saturn
system of justice, it appears that employment arbitration appears to have
become another Cadillac system for a few plaintiffs and another Rickshaw
system for most employees who still do not have access to justice in
employment disputes.
35 This may be a conservative estimate given that the number of employees covered
by AAA administered employment arbitration procedures grew from 3 million to 6
million between 1997 and 2001. Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair
Forum at Low Cost, 58 DIsP. RESOL. J. 9, 9-10 (2003). If growth continued at even half
this rate for the next 12 years, we would expect by 2013 some 12 million employees to be
covered by AAA administered procedures.
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